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ABSTRACT 
 
The market reaction to the disclosure of corporate news and the intra-industry 
effect of such announcements are two important topics in the accounting and finance 
domain. For instance, Taffler, Lu and Kausar (2004) shows that the market underreacts 
to the announcement of a going concern opinion (GCO), but completely anticipates the 
announcement of a going concern withdrawal (GCW) (Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2006). 
In addition, Coelho, Peixinho and Terjesen (2014) shows that the GCO disclosure 
generates an intra-industry competitive effect in the industry rival firms. However, little 
is known about the intra-industry effect of a GCW. 
 
This master thesis investigates investors’ reaction to the withdrawal of a going 
concern audit opinion. In particular, this research clarifies if this good news impacts in 
the industry rivals of GCW firms and contributes to understand if investors process 
immediately the implications of such news. The sample consists of 95 US companies 
that had their going concern audit opinion withdrawn between 1995 and 2008. It 
particularly investigates whether industry rivals of GCW firms experience abnormal 
returns in the surrounding days to the announcement of such good news by the 
announcing firms. 
 
The results show that, contrary to the GCW firms, rival firms are associated to 
negative abnormal returns of approximately -1,5% for the (-5, 5), (-6, 6) and (-10, 10) 
windows surrounding the GCW announcement. In addition, there is some evidence that 
this competitive effect is due to investor’s reaction immediately after the announcement 
day and not by an anticipation of the information. The robustness tests indicate that the 
competitive effect is likely to be influenced by the first GCW cases per industry and is 
not driven by the most representative industries in the GCW sample.  
 
Keywords: intra-industry effect, going concern withdrawal, audit report, competitive 
effect, good news 
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RESUMO 
 
Um dos princípios básicos subjacentes à atividade da uma empresa é o princípio 
da sua continuidade. Este princípio assume que a empresa continue a operar no futuro e 
que não pretende suspender a atividade, liquidar e empresa ou abrir um processo de 
falência. Partindo desse pressuposto, a entidade é obrigada a avaliar anualmente os seus 
ativos e a sua capacidade de cumprir com este princípio fundamental na contabilidade. 
As empresas de maior dimensão estão obrigadas à certificação legal das suas contas 
através de um auditor independente que, entre outras questões, deve avaliar se os 
pressupostos de continuidade se verificam. Nos casos em que tal não se verifica, o 
auditor tem a responsabilidade de divulgar esta situação no seu relatório. A notícia da 
possivel incapacidade da empresa para continuar em atividade é tornada pública no 
relatório anual de auditoria da empresa, que conclui com a opinião modificada da 
continuidade (GCO). "A GCO é a confirmação anual do auditor independente da 
deterioração da situação financeira da empresa, a existência de dúvidas significativas 
sobre a capacidade da empresa para continuar a sua atividade, e de aperto das restrições 
de dívida." (Herbohn, Ragunathan e Garsden, 2007). 
 
A publicação de um relatório de auditoria colocando em causa o princpio da 
continuidade é interpretado pelo mercado como um evento de más noticias (e.g., 
Taffler, Lu and Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2009). Esta interpretação deriva 
do facto da empresa poder entrar em falência no curto prazo caso não sejam tomadas 
medidas adequadas para restaurar a sua atividade normal. Taffler, Lu e Kausar (2004) e 
Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2009) mostraram que o mercado reage de forma diferente 
consoante a informação seja negativa (GCO) ou positiva (GCW). Estes artigos 
concluem que o ajustamento em baixa do valor de mercado aquando da divulgação do 
GCO não é suficiente uma vez que existem retornos anormais negativos no durante o 
ano subsequente à data do evento. No entanto, concluem que o mercado anticipa 
completamente o efeito positivo da divulgação de um GCW na empresa anunciante.  
 
Entretanto, o efeito das notícias associadas a problemas de continuidade nas 
empresas que operam no mesmo setor de atividade das empresas anunciantes está pouco 
explorado na literatura. Um dos poucos estudos que analisa o impacto do GCO nas 
empresas rivais da anunciante (Coelho, Peixinho e Terjesen, 2014) releva que o GCO 
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tem também impacto nas empresas do mesmo setor de atividade ao identificar um efeito 
competitivo na indústria. Este estudo identificou retornos anormais positivos nas 
empresas do mesmo setor de atividade da empresa alvo como consequência do anúncio 
do GCO por parte da empresa alvo. 
 
Existe alguma literatura que investiga o impacto da má notícia revelada pelo 
GCO quer nas empresas anunciantes quer nas empresas da mesma indústria. Contudo, 
existem poucos estudos sobre o impacto da boa notícia associada à retirada do GCO por 
parte dos auditores. A retirada das dúvidas do auditor em relação ao princípio da 
continuidade da empresa (GCW) é efetuada quando o auditor independente entende que 
os problemas identificados aquando do GCO foram resolvidos e que a empresa já não se 
encontra em risco de falência. Este GCW é considerado um evento bastante favorável 
para a empresa alvo. Apesar disso, não existem estudos que avaliem o impacto deste 
evento nas empresas do mesmo setor de atividade.  
 
Esta dissertação de mestrado investiga o impacto da divulgação de um GCW nas 
empresas do mesmo setor de atividade da empresa anunciante e efetua uma primeira 
análise a este tema ainda não explorado na literatura financeira. O estudo empírico 
envolve uma amostra de 95 empresas norte-americanas para as quais os auditores 
retiraram o relatório desfavorável de auditoria (GCO) após considerarem que os 
problemas relacionados com a continuidade das empresas estavam resolvidos e 2.673 
empresas que operavam no mesmo setor de atividade aquando desse evento para o 
período entre 1995 e 2008. Em particular, são calculados os retornos anormais para 
estas empresas rivais nos dias em torno da divulgação pública do GCW com o objetivo 
de testar se esta informação tem impacto nas empresas concorrentes do mesmo setor de 
atividade.  
 
Os resultados desta dissertação revelam que, tal como sugerido em estudos 
anteriores, o anúncio do GCW não tem qualquer impacto significativo no valor de 
mercado das empresas anunciantes nos dias em torno desse anúncio. Mais interessante 
para o âmbito deste estudo, os resultados revelam uma situação diferente para as 
empresas que operam no mesmo setor de atividade. Para estas empresas, os resultados 
sugerem um efeito competitivo devido à deteção de retornos anormais negativos nos 
dias em torno do anúncio do GCW por parte das empresas alvo. Em particular, os 
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períodos (-5, 5), (-6, 6) e (-10, 10) estão associados a retornos anormais significativos 
de aproximadamente -1,5%. Os resultados sugerem também que este efeito competitivo 
se deve a uma reação dos investidores à notícia e não a um possivel efeito de 
antecipação uma vez que os retornos anormais negativos estão concentrados na semana 
posterior à divulgação da notícia. Os testes de robustez sugerem também que o efeito de 
competição é potenciado pelo primeiro caso de GCW para cada industria e os retornos 
anormais não se verificam apenas nas industrias com mais casos na amostra.  
 
Conjuntamente, os resultados desta dissertação sugerem que o anúncio público 
de que os problemas relacionados com a continuidade das empresas estão resolvidos 
tem impacto nas empresas rivais do anunciante. O efeito competitivo detetado pode ser 
útil para os investidores no seu processo de tomada de deciões de investimento. Os 
resultados desta dissertação devem, no entanto, ser lidos com prudência uma vez que o 
número de casos identificados não é suficientemente grande para se poder efetuar testes 
potentes à robustez das conclusões. 
 
Palavras-chave: efeito intra-indústria, retirada de opiniões de continuidade 
desfavoráveis, relatório de auditoria, efeito competitivo, boas notícias 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the basic principles underlying the initiating of an entity is the going 
concern. This prime principle requires that a company will continue to operate normally 
in the future, it does not intend to stop working and is not compelled to enter into 
bankruptcy, liquidation or significantly reduce their activity. Based on this assumption, 
an entity is required to assess property items at their current value, according to the 
utility of the item, the state and its active market price. Auditors are responsible for the 
assessment of entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. When auditors are aware 
of material uncertainties related to events or conditions that may cast significant doubt 
upon the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, those uncertainties shall be 
disclosed in the company’s annual audit report (Staff Audit Practice Alert, 2009). An 
auditor will evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to 
continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time. In case of recognizing the 
lack of financial stability of the company, the auditor will issue a going concern opinion 
(GCO). ”A GCO is an independent confirmation by an auditor of a firm’s deteriorating 
financial condition, the existence of significant doubt about a firm’s ability to continue 
as a going concern, and of tightening of debt constraints.” (Herbohn, Ragunathan and 
Garsden, 2007). 
 
By all means, the release of a GCO is interpreted as bad news by the market 
(e.g., Taffler, Lu and Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2006), as the company 
may end up bankrupt if it doesn’t take proper actions to restore its normal activity. 
There is some evidence that, the disclosure of a GCO affects not only the target firm but 
also firms that operate in the same industry. For instance, Coelho, Peixinho and 
Terjensen (2014) shows that, at the announcement date, the value of the value-weighted 
(equally weighted) portfolio of industry rivals increases, on average, 0.37% (0.24%) on 
a risk-adjusted basis. This small percentage increase in the rivals’ market price actually 
represents over $171 billion, in 2009 constant dollars, clearly demonstrating the 
economic importance of these findings. The GCO competitive effect is stronger when 
the announcing firm is more profitable but is mitigated when a positive earnings 
surprise is contemporaneous to the disclosure of the qualified audit report. 
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For those cases where the GCO firm recovers from their going concern 
uncertainties, in a way that there is no doubt about its ability to continue as a going 
concern, the auditor is expected to withdrawn his previous GCO audit report (GCW). 
The disclosure of a GCW is interpreted as an unqualified audit opinion and signals that 
the entity regained the normal activity and there is no evidence of an eventual collapse. 
Previous studies have already shown that the market reaction to going concern 
disclosures is dependent on the nature of the event: the market underreacts to the 
negative content of a GCO (e.g., Taffler, Lu and Kausar, 2004) whereas fully 
anticipates the positive content of a GCW (Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2006).  
 
Despite the market impact of a GCW disclosure in the target firm has been 
already explored, little is known about the effect of such good news in their industry 
rivals. This master thesis focuses related issues by exploring the intra-industry effect of 
a going concern withdrawn opinion. In particular, it investigates if rival firms exhibit 
abnormal returns around the GCW announcement date. This research contributes to 
understand whether investors of rival firms value the disclosure of a going concern 
withdrawn audit opinion by a firm operating in the same industry. 
 
The sample of this study consists of 95 cases of firms traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ for which auditors withdrawn a going-concern audit report 
between 1995 and 2008 and 2.673 rival firms. Results reveal that GCW firms are not 
associated to abnormal returns in the days surrounding the announcement of such good 
news. This result confirms that markets fully anticipate the positive content of such 
GCW reports (Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2009) and suggests that the GCW 
announcement does not offer relevant information to investors of announcing firms. 
More interestingly, results show some evidence of a negative abnormal performance for 
the portfolio of rival firms, rejecting the null hypothesis of this study. This finding 
highlights that the content of a GCW disclosure has important information for firms 
operating in the same industry of the announcing firms as it is expected to generate an 
intra-industry competitive effect. The robustness tests emphasize that the intra-industry 
competitive effect depends on the industry where the announcing firm is operating. In 
fact, some industries are more likely to experience the competitive effect than the 
others.  
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The next section contains the background of the tangent literature. Section three 
describes the data and the methodology and section four presents and discusses the 
results of our research. Last section concludes and highlights some remarks for the 
future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Firms are expected to operate uninterrupted in the foreseeable future. The 
disclosure of a going concern opinion (GCO) raises serious doubts on the ability of the 
firm to continue its normal condition and calls attention to an increased risk of 
bankruptcy. The GCO constitutes an extreme bad news event as the existing literature 
shows that the announcing firms experience negative abnormal stock returns in different 
time frames surrounding the event date. In contrast, the withdrawal of such opinion 
(GCW) is associated to good news as auditors consider that going concern uncertainties 
were eliminated and previous studies find positive abnormal returns in the pre-GCW 
window.  
 
Several studies investigate whether investors react to the disclosure of a GCO 
both in short and medium-term. However, the amount of studies addressing the specific 
issue of a GCW is limited. So far, one of the main references in the GC domain is that 
of Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2006). This paper investigates the medium term stock price 
behavior of the first-time GCO companies. According to the results, one year prior to 
the GCO (GCW) announcement, the GCO firms’ mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
decline by -58% (median = -48%) whereas, the GCW firms’ mean buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns rise by 71% (median = 34%). Generally, the GCO firms underperform 
in the first year following the GCO by -16%, revealing that markets underreact to this 
extreme bad news. On the contrary, it assimilates immediately the withdrawal of a first-
time GCO as there is no evidence of significant market reaction following the 
announcement of a withdrawn going-concern opinion. 
 
Despite several studies addressing the impact of a GCO and GCW on the 
announcing firms, little is known about the impact of such information on their industry 
rivals. In one of the few exceptions, Coelho, Peixinho and Terjensen (2014) discusses 
the reaction of industry rival firms to the announcement of a GCO. They suggest that 
GCOs generate an intra-industry competitive effect, characterized by the increase in the 
equity market value of the portfolio of the industry rivals. This study highlights the 
importance of accounting information in financial markets, demonstrating that the 
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market is incapable of correctly pricing how the GCOs affect both the announcing firms 
and their competitors. Despite this first comprehensive analysis on the impact of a GCO 
disclosure in the industry rivals, there are no studies addressing whether industry rivals 
react to the GCW announcement or not. As such, this thesis provides the first analysis to 
understand this issue.  
 
2.1 Market reaction to new information 
 
a. Market under and overreaction 
 
Efficient markets are characterized by assimilating new relevant news into stock 
prices immediately when information is made public. In the words of Fama (1970) ”it is 
impossible to beat the market because prices already incorporate and reflect all relevant 
information”. However, several studies provide evidence of market underreaction and 
overreaction following the disclosure of new relevant information. Underreaction to 
new information occurs when the average return on the firm’s stock in the period 
following an announcement of good (bad) news is highler (lower) than its expected 
return. Overreaction to new information occurs when the average return on the firm’s 
stock in the period following an announcement of good (bad) news is lower (higher) 
than its expected return. In other words, an abnormal reaction is observed when the 
initial market reaction following the disclosure of new information was not efficient and 
this mistake is, at least, partially corrected in the following period, spreading the impact 
of the announcement on the price over time.  
 
Kausar and Taffler (2005) explore behavioral finance models of market 
underreaction to the bad news and overreaction to the good news. The authors use the 
going concern audit opinion as bad news event and its withdrawal as good news event. 
One of the explored models is the one of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998), 
which assumes that ”investors are overconfident and exhibit biased self-attribution” 
meaning that the investors create a pattern out of their past long-term trading 
experiences and if the market information they receive is different from their 
expectations, they react with hesitation to either good or bad news. The Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) model of behavior devides investors in two categories: 
representative investors and conservatist investors. The first fail to consider the laws of 
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probability and react in such a way that the information they have received is of the 
return generating process, the second are slow to improve their previous judgments in 
response to new information. The Hong and Stein (1999) model points out two types of 
investors: “newswatchers” who trade on private information, and “momentum traders” 
who trade on simple projections by investigating the changes of the past prices. 
 
These behavioral finance models are useful to understand the documented 
differential market reaction to new information depending on their nature: markets tend 
to fully incorporate the content of the good news while they underreact to the disclosure 
of the bad news. Kausar (2005) examines this issue by exploring the going concern 
anomaly conditional on the nature of the news in the U.S. He uses the going-concern 
opinion as news event because such disclosures impacts on firms’ financial distress and 
is therefore of potentially severe influence on investors. He finds that the market gives 
an asymmetric response to first time GCOs (bad news) and their consequent withdrawal 
(good news). The results show that the market underreacts to bad news disclosures 
presenting a -16% downward drift in the year following the publication of the going 
concern modified opinion. In contrast, the same research shows that there are no 
subsequent abnormal returns to the going concern withdrawn audit opinion (good 
news). 
 
Coelho, John and Taffler (2010) show similar evidence in the case of bankruptcy 
announcements. They investigate how the market deals with the annoucement of both 
strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s, which are both negative events but with 
significant different underlying motivations. In particular, strategic bankruptcies are 
seen as managers trying to maximize the value for shareholders at the expense of 
debtholders whereas non-strategic bankruptcies are your every-day business failure. 
Coelho et al (2010) show that the market underreacts to the announcement of non-
strategic Chapter 11s while overreacting to the parallel strategic event.  
 
Chan (2003) presents an interesting study by collecting a sample that contained 
all forms of news, without any selection criteria. This method gives a unique context to 
the paper as previous studies were exploring abnormal reactions only to events that 
show unusual patterns. The aim was to investigate if underreaction or overreaction 
remains a feature of the data by looking at a wider class of events than previously 
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examined (using a vast sample of headlines for a large, randomly selected group of 
firms). The tested hypothesis was that stocks exhibit no abnormal return after public 
news and concluded that it was not the case. Stocks that encountered negative returns 
same as the incidence of the news story continued to underperform. Stocks that dealt 
with good news revealed less drift. Stocks with extreme returns that had no news 
headlines for a given month encountered a turnaround in the subsequent month and little 
abnormal performance after that. The post-event drift was very robust and mostly taking 
place after bad news. The conclusion of overreaction was rather weaker, since the 
reversal of returns could be driven by liquidity effects. Even after waiting a week to 
follow a no-news long-short strategy, the reversal continued to appear. The same model 
of news drift and no-news reversal during the first month was shown by the buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. The study showed that underreaction was mostly limited to small 
stocks as the drift patterns were less evident when increasing the size quintiles and at 
the same time, were stronger for low-priced stocks even if the results for higher-priced 
stocks did hold too.  
 
In contrast to some studies showing that markets tend to overreact to good news 
and underreact to bad news, Alwathnani and Dubofsky (2014) suggest that investors 
overreact to extreme good or bad earnings news. The initial unexpected earnings 
surprise (SUE) signal triggers a strong market price reaction over the three-day period 
around the earnings announcement date. Confirming SUE signals create additional 
return momentum, but the price impact of the confirming SUE news is weaker than the 
price impact of the initial SUE news. Lastly, firms reporting earnings performance that 
are inconsistent with their initial SUE rankings exhibit a strong price reversal. The 
evidence that the authors provide shows a securities market that is prone to an 
overreaction to salient and extreme earnings measures casting serious doubt on the 
traditional view that interprets the finding of the earnings momentum literature as an 
investor underreaction to earnings news. 
 
Zhang et al. (2013) bring together two related literatures on information risk and 
transaction costs to deliver a wider research on price discovery around and after 
earnings announcements. They analyse what authors called the Information Content 
hypothesis showing that ”public disclosure has a higher relative importance in firms 
with higher information risk, and hence traders will react more strongly to the earnings 
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surprises of firms with higher information risk; however, this hypothesis predicts no 
effect of information risk on subsequent drift”. The second test is the Transaction Cost  
hypothesis which shows that ”transaction costs constrain the initial market reaction and 
this leads to a positive association with post-earnings announcement returns”. In this 
study, the authors have examined the initial market reaction and the subsequent post 
announcement returns. Their findings revealed the direct information risk effect, when 
the earnings of firms with higher information risk bring more new information to the 
market and produce higher inicial market reaction. Also they conclude that higher 
information risk generates higher transaction costs, which slow down the flow of 
information into stock prices and explain their higher post–earnings announcement 
returns. But once the transaction costs are beeing taken under control, the post-earnings 
strategy doesn’t earn abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Generally, this paper shows how 
important are the firm level information environments in determining the market 
reaction to public disclosures. 
 
b. Market reaction to bad news 
 
Several studies suggest that the market tends to process bad news slowly. For 
instance, Taffler et al. (2004) investigate the medium-term price reaction to GCO 
disclosures by London Stock Exchange (LSE) firms over the one calendar year period 
subsequent to their publication in the firm’s annual report. Particularly, they investigate 
whether such price relevant information is seized fully by or around the GCO release 
date according to the efficient markets hypothesis, or whether the implications of this 
bad news disclosure appear to be difficult to assimilate, taking time to be absorbed by 
the stock market. The results show that over the 12-month period starting with the 
beginning of the month following the GCO disclosure date, the sample firms 
underperform by between 24% and 31%, depending on the benchmark adopted.  
 
Kausar et al. (2009) further investigate the market reaction to the announcement 
of first-time going concern opinions in the United States, and their subsequent 
withdrawal. Results show that the market does not assimilate the going concern opinion 
signal on a timely basis in the United States, leading to a market underreaction of −14% 
over the following one year period. They also explore the market reaction to going-
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concern withdrawals in the following 12-month period, and conclude that the disclosure 
of such good news is, in contrast, processed on a timely basis by the market. 
 
Coelho (2008) explored how the US equity market reacts to bankruptcy 
announcements. He finds a strong negative mean post-bankruptcy announcement drift 
which fluctuates between -24% and -44% in the subsequent year to the event date 
depending on the adopted method of measuring abnormal returns. After performing a 
series of robustness tests, the author shows that the post-bankruptcy drift is not absorbed 
by known factors like the post-earnings announcement drift, the post-first-time going 
concern drift, the momentum effect, the book-to-market effect, industry clustering or 
the level of financial distress. He shows that the main result is robust to different 
methods for conducting longer-term event studies. Overall, the results confirm that the 
market is unable to deal properly with severe bad news events. In addition, Coelho and 
Taffler (2008) shows that, despite the market anticipation of bankruptcy announcements 
and the strong negative price reaction to the bankruptcy announcement, prices of 
bankrupt firms continue to decrease, leading to a post-bankruptcy abnormal return of 
minus 28% during the 12-months following the event date. These findings are in line 
with Taffler et al. (2004) and Kausar et al. (2009) and reinforce the notion that the 
market needs almost a year to completely assimilate bad news. 
 
Another research in this field is based on the information of the Korean stock 
market. Lee and Cho (2014) analyze whether stock prices respond to public news and 
how such a response influences the effectiveness of the momentum strategy. Their 
findings show that stock prices respond asymmetrically to public news, and this result is 
supported by the transaction costs hypothesis they tested, rather than their “bad news 
travel slowly” hypothesis. In their research, they register that stocks with news 
headlines generate positive momentum profits one year after the news. Those profits are 
attributable mostly to the return drift of loser stocks with news, but are canceled out by 
losses caused by the return reversals of winner stocks with and without news. 
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2.2 Going Concern Opinions 
 
As can be witnessed in a variety of studies, the GCO firms underperform in 
comparison to similar non-GCO financially distressed firms in the 12 months before the 
announcement of the event. Also, the GCO firms make significantly more GCO-related 
disclosures in the 12 month period before the event than do equivalently non-GCO 
financially distressed firms for the same period. (Herbohn, Ragunathan and Garsden, 
2007) 
 
a. Auditors and the GCO decision 
 
Even though the auditing standard on going concern is the same to all the 
auditors, the ”threshold” for issuing or withdrawing a going concern opinion seems to 
vary from time to time suggesting that the auditors are inconsistent in issuing or 
withdrawing such an opinion (Tronnes, 2010 and Tronnes, 2011). According to SAS 
No. 59, this ”threshold” must happen when doubt about the correctness of the going 
concern assumption changes from “not substantial” to “substantial”. Figure one shows 
the “threshold” and the conditions of crossing it from one side to another. 
 
 
Good 
 
Inicial Going 
Concern 
Withdrawn Going 
Concern 
Financial Opinion Opinion 
Health Clean Audit 
A Opinion D 
Substancial Doubt 
Threshold 
B Going Concern C 
Bad Opinion 
Financial 
Health 
 
Figure 1: Substantial Doubt Threshold for Issuing and Withdrawing Going Concern 
Modifications  
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It is this threshold that might be interpreted in a different and individual way by 
auditors, which causes the inconsistency in issuing the going concern modification or 
its’ withdrawal in the first place. The research concludes that the issue of inconsistency 
is noticeable when the companies change auditors. The new auditors tend to have a 
higher threshold in withdrawing the going concern modification than the previous 
auditors had in issuing the first time modification. It is only a matter of different 
interpretation of the standards and the result of the auditors facing the pressure of 
Reputation, Litigation and Dismissal Risks (Tronnes, 2011). Also, a risk premium in the 
year of the GCW was documented in the audit payments for the audit companies that 
kept their client after issuing a GCO in the previous year (Tronnes, 2010). The 
information delivered by the audit reports is valuable for different stakeholders, and the 
inconsistency in issuing one might be a matter of the further wrongful interpretation by 
its’ users. 
 
b. Investors and shareholders 
 
A joint study of the US and UK investors’ reaction to the GCO release reveals a 
negative reaction at both, the time of the announcement and a longer-term afterwards.  
Such a response only indicates to the direct relevance of the GCO information to the 
capital markets, betraying also a stronger adverse reaction of the UK invertors in 
comparison to the US investors in the short and long-term. 
 
Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2006) compare the information content of the GCO 
issued by auditors in the U.S. and in the U.K.. They test whether this effectively 
identical information cue carries similar meaning (i.e. is equally informative) to 
investors across these two very comparable institutional and market environments. One 
important difference between the U.S. and U.K. legal regimes relates to the strikingly 
different bankruptcy codes. Results demonstrate how effectively the same accounting 
signal, the auditor’s going-concern opinion, has very different levels of informativeness 
to investors in the U.S. and the U.K. due to the differences in their bankruptcy regimes.  
 
Comparing the U.S. and U.K. institutional frameworks, the U.S. is biased more 
towards the rights of debtors, and therefore preservation of the firm as a going-concern 
is a priority, whereas the U.K. focuses more on the rights of creditors and therefore 
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premature liquidation is more likely. Once a firm enters bankruptcy proceedings in the 
U.K., it is unlikely that stockholders’ equity has any residual value. Consequently, a 
going-concern opinion, which signals increased bankruptcy risk, should have a more 
negative market response in the U.K. than a going-concern opinion in the U.S.  
 
Authors show that there is a significant negative market reaction to the going-
concern modified audit opinion in both institutional environments around the day that it 
is announced, and additionally over the subsequent one-year period. They observe a 
differential market response to the GCO announcement between the U.S. and the U.K.. 
Over the 3-day interval centered on the GCO announcement date average abnormal 
returns are -4.2% in the U.S. and -6.8% in the U.K.. Over the one-year period starting at 
the beginning of the following month, average firm buy-and-hold abnormal returns are  
-18.1% in the U.S. and -31.3% in the U.K..  In conclusion, U.K. firms experience more 
severe negative market reaction to the GCO announcement than U.S. firms. 
 
In the research that analyzes the GCO and GCW event from the shareholders’ 
point of view, Kausar (2005) concludes that the institutions trade rationally in 
comparison to the opposite behavior of the retail investors. Using the going-concern 
modified audit report disclosure domain, this study tests whether investors rationally 
incorporate new pessimistic (optimistic) information and if the markets under or 
overreact to bad (good) news in the going concern domain. The author finds an 
asymmetric market response to first time going-concern modified audit report 
disclosures (bad news) and withdrawal of the going-concern modified audit report 
disclosures (good news). He finds that the market underreacts to going-concern 
modified audit report disclosures (bad news), resulting in a downward drift of around -
16% over the one-year period subsequent to the publication of going-concern modified 
audit opinion. In contrast, investors eficiently incorporate the withdrawal of such 
adverse reports as no abnormal returns are observed following the event date. 
 
Kausar (2005) also explores the trading behaviour of different classes of 
investors in GCO firms and test whether institutional investors and retail investors 
exhibit similar trading biases. The results show that the institutional holdings decline 
from 16.7% to 5.3% over the two year period around the GCO event, meanwhile, retail 
holdings increase from 69.4% to 82.7%. On the other hand, there is no significant 
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change during the 9 quarters around the GCW date for either institutional or retail 
holdings. Such results reveal that institutional investors reduce their holdings in such 
stocks on a timely basis in contrast to retail investors who appear to increase their 
holdings in such distressed stocks. These results suggest that the evidence of stock 
mispricing and extended post-going-concern drift might then be explained by limits to 
arbitrage argument with retail investors keeping stock prices artificially high by trading 
inappropriately in these stocks because of behavioural biases identified in the literature 
and skilled investors (professional arbitrageurs) having limited incentive to trade in 
these small firms because of high costs. 
 
Kausar et al. (2013) find that the socioeconomic, religious and racial/ethnic 
characteristics of GCO investors are very similar to those of retail investors who are 
more attracted towards speculative, and lottery-type stocks. This study also finds that 
the net buying behavior of GCO investors is also significantly related to local 
socioeconomic characteristics. Inicially, the authors show that GCO firm stocks are 
particularly attractive to retail investors who trade for speculative reasons. In fact, these 
stocks have lottery-type characteristics, representing cheap bets with negative expected 
return with a small probability of a high payoff around the GCO event date, and these 
characteristics become even more pronounced over the following 12-months. In contrast 
to the sophisticated investors, retail investors searching for cheap bets are likely to 
behave in an opposite way and buy such speculative stocks. Therefore, the established 
going-concern anomaly may be largely driven by retail investor prone to “gambling in 
the market” by increasing their holdings in the GCO firms, and the volume of their 
trades. 
 
While examining whether the going-concern anomaly is driven by the trading 
activities of retail investors who are attracted to GCO stocks because of their lottery-
type characteristics, Kausar et al. (2013) find that GCO firms with dollar volume of 
small buy orders exceeding dollar volume of small sell orders at the GCO date 
underperform those GCO firms with a negative net small order imbalance by almost -
28% over the following one-year period. Therefore, abnormal retail buying around 
GCO events is an important driver of the observed market underreaction. Authors also 
find increased individual investor tendency to purchase those stocks. Such trading 
behavior inhibits the timely assimilation of the adverse information conveyed by the 
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GCO audit report into market prices. After performing several other tests without any 
substantial explanations for the GCO anomaly, authors conclude that the gambling-
motivated behaviour of retail investors is in all probability the cause of the anomalous 
short-term market reaction and the affiliated long-term market reaction to the 
announcing of a GCO.  
 
Taking into consideration that the market reaction is a consequence of market 
participants´ behavior (i.e., retail and large investors), the effects of the disclosure of 
such important negative accounting information depends on the degree of sophistication 
of the receiver. In this context, Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2006) investigate the 
relationship between market reaction to GCO and the sophistication of the shareholders. 
The study demonstrates that the institutional holdings have declined in the 9 quarters 
period around the GCO announcement, the retail holdings have increased and the 
insider holdings haven’t changed materially. The incorrect trading behavior of the retail 
investors keeps the stock prices artificially high, and this might explain the stock 
mispricing and extended post-GCO drift. On the other hand, the abnormal stock market 
reaction to going concern audit reports is affected by information asymmetries such as 
managerial ownership, firm size and proportion of debt (Ittonen, 2011). 
 
2.3 Intra-industry information transfers 
 
Market reaction to GCO and GCW has been investigated in several studies from 
the announcement firm perspective. In general, these studies suggest that the GCO is an 
unanbiguous case of bad news since markets react negatively to the announcement of 
such information. In addition, these studies also show that the market reaction to GCOs 
is incomplete as negative abnormal returns continue to be observed in the one-year 
period following the event date. In contrast, markets fully anticipate the favorable 
content of a GCW and there is no abnormal return following the event disclosure. 
However, litle is known about wether going-concern uncertainties of GCO firms impact 
in their rival firms. In one of the few studies in this domain, Coelho, Peixinho and 
Terjesen (2014) find a competitive effect of GCOs for firms operating in the same 
industry. This section reviews some studies that address the effect of important news to 
the industry rivals of the announcing firms. 
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In a seminal study, Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate whether bankruptcy 
announcements are related to a contagion or competitive effect on the rival firms 
operating in the same industry of the announcing firms. The contagion effect is 
represented by the loss of wealth encountered by firms with similar cash flow features 
to those of the bankrupt firm owing to the fact that the bankruptcy announcement 
reveals information about the present value of cash flows for these firms. The 
competitive effect is the gain of wealth encountered by competitors due to the fact that 
the bankruptcy announcement reveals information about the present and future 
competitive positions of firms in the industry of the bankrupt firm. They show that the 
competitive effect is presiding in industries with low leverage and competition degree. 
This is shown by the 1% fall in the value of a value-weighted portfolio of the common 
stocks of competitors in the whole sample contrasting with the increase by 2,2% of the 
portfolio in the sample with low leverage and a low degree of competition on one side 
and the loss by 3,2% of the portfolio in the sample with high leverage and a high degree 
of competition on the other side. 
 
Intra-industry effect has been analysed in the bank failure content. In fact, the 
bank regulating system is considered to be often guided by the contagion effect of bank 
failure, especially of a large one (Aharony and Swary, 1983). Such an event can be the 
cause of loss of trust in the bank system, which might lead to weakening the economic 
situation. After analizing the stock prices of three different sized solvent bank groups 
and the failed banks, Aharony and Swary (1983) conclude that there is no evidence of 
contagion effect in the case of bank failure, that was caused by fraud and internal 
factors. While analizing the case of the bank failure caused by external factors, the 
authors registered a decrease in the stock prices of the solvent banks, which was 
considered rather a common reaction to the negative signals, than a contagion effect. 
 
In search of the ”pure” contagion effect, defined as the contagion effect 
originated from a bank failure caused by fraud and internal irregularities, Kanas (2004) 
analysed one of the largest bank failures known worldwide, the failure of Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). The study was based on the three 
developed economies where BCCI had established operations, the U.S., the U.K. and 
Canada. The results have shown the existence of the contagion effect in the U.K. even 
before the announcement date, the capital markets have reacted negatively and this was 
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reflected into the share prices of all three banks in the U.K.. These reactions have 
questioned the BCCI regulation in U.K.. In the U.S. and Canada, no contagion effect 
was registered, and this indicates that in these countries the bank regulation is adequate 
in the way that it prevents the spread of the contagion effect caused by the fraudulent 
governance of a bank, even if it is a large one. 
 
Brewer and Jackson (2002) investigate the impact of commercial banks and life 
insurance companies’ financial distress. Contrary to the majority of the existing 
literature, they focus on the inter-industry effect instead of intra-industry effect. The 
study finds a strong shareholder wealth effect, which is considered to take place not 
entirely due to the contagion effect, but also to geographic proximity, asset and liability 
portfolio composition and regulatory expectations.  
 
There is also evidence that the disclosure of a GCO affects not only the target 
firm but also firms that operate in the same industry. In the real state context, Elliott, 
Highfield and Schaub (2006) conclude that a competitive effect is being observed at the 
disclosure of the GCO. This study suggests that there is no evidence to support the 
contagion effect since the investors consider the audit, hence the  announcing of a GCO, 
a firm-specific problem and do not consider that it affects the whole industry. The 
competitive effect on the other hand, finds an explanation in the reaction of the 
customers and the investors, who are moving their business and proprietorship 
respectively, from the affected firm to a competing firm. As a consequence, the rival 
firm is experiencing an encrease in sales, profits, market share, followed by higher stock 
prices.  
 
Using a larger sample of GCO firms of diferent industries, Coelho, Peixinho and 
Terjensen (2014) show that, at the announcement date, the value of the value-weighted 
(equally weighted) portfolio of industry rivals increases, on average, 0.37% (0.24%) on 
a risk-adjusted basis. This small percentage increase in the rivals’ market price actually 
represents over $171 billion, in 2009 constant dollars, clearly demonstrating the 
economic importance of these findings. The GCO competitive effect is stronger when 
the announcing firm is more profitable but is mitigated when a positive earnings 
surprise is contemporaneous to the disclosure of the qualified audit report. 
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CHAPTER 3 - DATA AND METHODOLODY 
 
3.1 Data collection process 
 
The data collecting process for the research sample consists of dividing the work 
in two major parts. First, it identifies the going concern announcing companies (GCO 
cases) and second, recognizes which of them experienced a GCO withdrawal in the 
subsequent year (GCW cases).  
 
Following the previous studies of Coelho, Peixinho and Terjensen (2014) and 
Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2009), this study uses the 10-K Wizard’s free text search tool 
to identify the sample firms. In particular, it uses “continue as a going concern” and 
“raise substantial doubt” as keywords to identify firms associated to going concern 
uncertainties that have information in the EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval) system in the period of time between 01/01/1994 and 
31/12/2007. This first step provides a large number of results consisting of thousands of 
firms, which undergo a further filtration in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged file. 
COMPUSTAT database contains accounting information for U.S. firms while CRSP 
database provides daily prices for those firms. All the firms that are not found in the 
merged file are eliminated as well as those that are not traded on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ in the one year prior to the GCO announcement. Furthermore, utility firms, 
financial firms, foreign companies, firms “in a development stage” and those which 
have already filed for bankruptcy are also excluded from the sample. This process 
identifies 439 initial GCO cases.  
 
The next stage consists of identifying the industry rivals of GCO firms using the 
4-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes tool that is used to identify the 
primary business of the announcing companies and their competitors. In order for the 
competitors to be considered in the sample, they have to meet several selection criteria. 
Likewise the GCO firms, they should have enough information available on 
COMPUSTAT in the year previous to the GCO reporting, trade common stock on 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ in the year prior to the GCO event date, have themselves a 
clean 10-K report in the preceding two years and eventually, do not report profits during 
the two-week period around the GCO event date. For a higher level of comparability, in 
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the final sample are accepted only the GCO cases which have no less than five industry 
rivals. 
The final step consists of identifying those cases for which auditors withdrawn 
the GCO audit report in order to identify the GCW cases. This is crucial as the aim of 
this thesis is to investigate the intra-industry effect of a GCW disclosure. As such, from 
these initial 439 GCO cases, we identify 95 GCW cases and a total of 2.673 rival firms. 
The higher concentration of GCW cases happened in 2004 in a number of 20 cases out 
of a total of 95, which is 21,0%, in 2000 and 2002 when where registered 14 GCW 
cases in each of the years (14,7% of total) and 12 GCW cases in 2008 (12,6%). The 
remaining years have registered less than 10 cases per year, with only one GCW case in 
1995, 1996 and 2003, 2 cases in 1998, 3 cases in 1997, 4 cases in 2001 and 2005, 6 
cases in 2006 and 2007 and 7 cases in 1999. The highest rate of GCW cases were 
registered within ”Pharmaceutical Preparations” industry (SIC code 2834) and 
”Services-Computer programming, data processing, etc.” industry (SIC code 7370).  
 
Another important detail to highlight is the real event date which, for the 
majority of the GCW cases is the 10-K filling date. Besides that, there are firms which 
disclose their GCWs before the 10-K report. In this case, the press release date is 
considered to be the event date. The data for the research is collected from the 10-K 
fillings. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. This table summarizes 
statistics associated to the GCW firms and their industry rivals. GCW firms are non-
utility, non-financial U.S. firms trading on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX that 
received a clean audit report in the subsequent year to their first-time going concern 
audit report between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2008. Industry rivals are publicly traded 
firms with the same 4-digit SIC code as the GCW firm, and data available on both 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT. All accounting data is collected from the 10-K report one 
year before the GCW publication date. 
Description of the variables in table 1: 
Size represents the equity market capitalization in U.S. Dollars in Millions ($m), 
measured at the release date of the GCW audit report.  
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Revenue represents total revenues in $m.  
ROA represents the return on assets, computed as the ratio of EBIT to total assets.  
CF Operations represents the cash-flow from operations in $m.  
Z-score represents a composite measure of financial distress computes as in Zmijewski 
(1984).  
Big 4 is a dummy that assumes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm or 
one of its predecessors and zero otherwise.  
 
Panel A of the table shows that, generally, the GCW firms are relatively small, 
with a mean market capitalization of $129,4 million and median market capitalization of 
only $69,5 million. The mean revenue of these firms is $185,8 million while the median 
value of the same variable is only $18,8 million. The firms in the GCW sample are still 
unprofitable demonstrating negative ROA (mean ROA = 44,1 percent; median ROA = 
26,1 percent) and even the mean cash-flows from operations are positive = $0,27 
million. These firms are still in difficulty of generating positive cash-flows from 
operations as shown by the median value of cash-flows from operations = -$3,8 million. 
The mean Z-score is 0,38 demonstrating that the sample firms are presenting a high 
level of distress. More than a half of GCW firms (61,1 percent) are audited by a Big 4 
audit firm. 
 
Table 1. Panel A. Descriptive statistics: GCW firms. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Low. Quart. Median Upp. Quart. 
Size  129,4 178,1 22,9 69,5 156 
Revenue 185,8 849,10 6,9 18,8 63,5 
CF 
Operations 
0,27 71,03 -10,3 -3,8 0,27 
ROA -44,10% 55,30% -63,10% -26,10% -5,80% 
Z-Score 0,38 9,01 -4,51 -2,31 3,49 
Big 4  61,10% - - - - 
 
Panel B of the table reveals the information on the industry rivals. With a 
median market capitalization of $236,3 million and a median total revenue of only 
$49,2 million, the 2.673 rival firms prove to be relatively small even if some of them are 
significantly large firms as the mean market capitalization for the 2.673 rival firms is 
$6.066,4 million with a mean total revenue of $1.382,5 million. The negative mean 
ROA of -24,7% and median ROA of -8,7% disclose their incapacity to generate profits.  
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The rival firms have a better indicator of cash-flows from operations compared 
to the GCW firms, with a mean value of $238,6 million and a median of -$1,2 million. 
With a Z-score of -2,94, the rival firms have a low probability of meeting financial 
difficulties. The majority of the rivals (89,6%) are audited by a Big 4 audit firm. 
 
Table 1. Panel B. Descriptive statistics: Industry rivals. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Low. Quart. Median Upp. Quart. 
Size  6066,4 31501 68,67 236,3 886,8 
Revenue 1382,5 6.256,00 12,47 49,2 261 
CF 
Operations 
238,6 1338 -12,37 -1,2 21,1 
ROA -24,67% 133,70% -34,70% -8,66% 6,34% 
Z-Score -2,94 30,6 -7,41 -5,35 -2,54 
Big 4  89,60% - - - - 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
Following the sample definition and data description, this section employs 
standard event study methods to investigate the impact of the GCW announcement on 
the announcing firms and industry rivals’ stock prices. Initially, the abnormal return of 
the announcing company is calculated, which determines the deviation of the current 
return of the common stock from what is expected to generate, as described in equation 
1: 
 
ARf,d = rf,d – E(rf,d)                                                                                                (1) 
 
where:  
rf,d – is the real return generated by the common stock of the GCW firm f on the day d; 
E(rf,d) – is the estimated return generated by the common stock of the GCW firm f on 
the day d. 
  
The estimated return is computed by using the market model, one of the most 
common models used. The abnormal return on a distinct day within the event window 
represents the difference between the actual stock return (Ri) on that day and the normal 
return, which is predicted based on two inputs; the typical relationship between the 
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firm's stock and its reference index (expressed by the α and β parameters), and the 
actual reference market's return (Rm). 
 
Ri = αi + βiRm + ei                                                                                             (2)  
 
where: 
Ri – is the return on stock i in period t; 
i – measures the sensitivity of a stock to stock market movements; 
Rm – is return on the market in period t. 
  
To measure the total impact of an event over a particular period of time (named 
the 'event window'), we add up individual abnormal returns to create a 'cumulative 
abnormal return' for every GCW firm f using the equation 3: 
 
CARf,i = 

2
1
,
t
ti
iARf                                                                                              (3) 
 
where: 
ARf,i – are the calculated abnormal returns using formula (1); 
i – is a certain interval of time. 
  
As used in the sample studies that hold multiple observations of individual event 
types, we further calculate cumulative average abnormal returns, which represent the 
mean values of identical events. The mean value of the CARs is determined as follows: 
 
CAR i = 1/n

n
f
iCARf
1
,                                                                                        (4) 
 
where: 
CARf,i – are the values of the cumulative abnormal returns calculated using formula 
(3); 
n – is the number of firms in the sample with information on the returns during the time 
interval i. 
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The rivals’ abnormal returns are computed accordingly to Lang and Stulz (1992) 
approach, which assumes the creation for every GCW firm of a value-weighted rivals’ 
portfolio containing the competing firms that passed through the rough selection process 
described on page 17. Thereby, a portfolio is being created for each GCW case within 
an industry with the sole purpose of showing the shifting composition of the industry. 
The abnormal returns of the industry rivals’ portfolio are acquired by calculating the 
market model variables with the help of the value-weighted portfolio’s returns. For 
obtaining the expected returns of the industry portfolios, were used the ordinary least 
square betas. Eventually, in order to be selected into the industry portfolio, rivals need 
to have at least 60 daily returns during the evaluation period and to trade no less than 
one time throughout this period. 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the results of this thesis. The first section reports the 
cumulative abnormal returns for GCW firms and their industry rivals surrounding the 
GCW event date. This allows investigating whether GCW information disclosure 
affects the price dynamics of announcing firms and firms operating in the same 
industry. The second section tests the robustness of the results by eliminating cases 
identified in the higher concentration year and cases belonging to most representative 
industries as well as computing results by industries with multiple GCW cases and 
presenting results by industry for all cases. 
 
4.1 Main results 
 
Table 2 displays the short-term cumulative abnormal daily stock returns 
associated with the disclosure of GCW report for both the announcing firms and their 
industry rivals. GCW firms are non-utility, non-financial U.S. firms trading on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX that receive a clean audit report in the subsequent year to 
their first-time going concern audit report between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2008. Industry 
rivals are publicly traded firms with the same 4-digit SIC code as the GCW firm, and 
data available on both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the market model residual in percent. 
The abnormal performance for industry rivals is the equally weighted average return of 
the 95 value-weighted rival portfolios.  
Description of the variables in table 2: 
Period is shown in trading days considering trading-day zero as the GCW event-date.  
N is the number of cases that were used in obtaining the cumulative abnormal returns.  
CAR is the mean cumulative abnormal return.  
P-value is the significance level of the results, it is a number between 0 and 1. If p-value 
(≤ 0.05), it indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, p-value (> 0.05) 
indicates weak evidence against the null hypothesis and a p-value close to the cutoff 
(0.05) is considered to be marginal (could go either way). 
% Positive is the percentage of positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
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Panel A presents the abnormal returns for different time windows for the GCW 
cases and reveals that abnormal returns are not statistically significant since the p-values 
associated with the CARs are higher than 0.1 These results suggest that there are no 
statistical differences between the price performance of GCW firms immediately before 
the event, during the event and immediately after the event when it is compared to the 
price performance estimated by the market model. In other words, the announcement of 
a GCW does not impact significantly in the stock returns of announcing firms. 
 
Table 2. Panel A. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for GCW firms. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 95 -0,011275 0,868 40% 
(-1; 0) 95 -0,018687 0,167 38% 
(-1; 1) 95 -0,015492 0,608 44% 
(2; 6) 95 0,005712 0,550 44% 
(-6; 6) 95 -0,021056 0,970 45% 
(-10; 10) 95 -0,058882 0,168 36% 
 
Panel B of table 2 presents the abnormal returns for different time windows for 
the portfolios of GCW firms’ industry rivals. The results suggest that before the 
announcement of such good news to the announcing firms, abnormal performance of 
their industry rivals is not statistically significant as the p-values associated to the (-6, -
2) and (-1, 0) periods are higher than 0.1.  
 
Table 2. Panel B. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for the industry rivals. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 95 -0,003082 0,272 42% 
(-1; 0) 95 -0,001658 0,918 46% 
(-1; 1) 95 -0,004627 0,703 42% 
(2; 6) 95 -0,00434 0,074 40% 
(-5; 5) 95 -0,015638 0,025 36% 
(-6; 6) 95 -0,012049 0,037 41% 
(-10; 10) 95 -0,014938 0,031 34% 
 
However, when one considers the subsequent days to the event and looks to the 
windows defined around the event-day (e.g., (-5, 5), (-6, 6) and (-10, 10), the results 
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indicate that industry rivals exhibit negative and significant price performance. For 
instance, the CAR (-5, 5) associated to the 95 portfolios of industry rivals is -1,56% and 
is statistically significant (p-value = 0.025). The results for the (2, 6) period reinforce 
that the negative abnormal performance of industry rivals is due to investor’s reaction 
immediately after the announcement day. 
These first results suggest that the market value of GCW firms is not affected by 
the announcement of this event but their industry rivals are affected by such 
announcement. In particular, the negative abnormal performance of industry rivals 
reveals the presence of a competitive effect within the industries. 
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
 
This section tests the robustness of the main conclusion presented in the 
previous section. As the general statistics in Table 1 show, the majority of GCWs 
happened in 2004 and belong to ”Pharmaceutical Preparations” industry (SIC code 
2834) and ”Services-Computer programming, data processing, etc.” industry (SIC code 
7370). Therefore, this first robustness test analyzes how exactly the event year and 
industry concentration affect the main results. The test begins by creating two sub-
samples. The first sub-sample consists of rival firms for all GCW cases excluding those 
that took place in the year of 2004. The second sub-sample consists of rival firms for all 
GCW cases excluding those belonging to the two industries with the highest number of 
occurrences. Abnormal stock returns of these two sub-samples are computed as 
described in the equations of chapter 3. 
Table 3 presents the short-term cumulative abnormal daily stock returns 
associated with the disclosure of GCW report for industry rivals. GCW firms are non-
utility, non-financial U.S. firms trading on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX that receive 
a clean audit report in the subsequent year to their first-time going concern audit report 
between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2008. Industry rivals are publicly traded firms with the 
same 4-digit SIC code as the GCW firm, and data available on both CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. 
 The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) represents the market model residual in 
percent. The abnormal performance for industry rivals represents the equally weighted 
average return of the 95 value-weighted rival portfolios.  
Description of the variables in table 3: 
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Period is shown in trading days considering trading-day zero as the GCW event-date.  
N is the number of cases that were used in obtaining the cumulative abnormal returns.  
CAR is the mean cumulative abnormal return.  
P-value is the significance level of the results, it is a number between 0 and 1. If p-value 
(≤ 0.05), it indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, p-value (> 0.05) 
indicates weak evidence against the null hypothesis and a p-value close to the cutoff 
(0.05) is considered to be marginal (could go either way). 
% Positive is the percentage of positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
Additionally, in Panel E: 
Sic Code represents the 4-digit SIC code of each individual industry. 
Events represents the number of GCW events within each individual industry. 
Rivals represents the average number of rivals per GCW event. 
 
The results for the first sub-sample are described in Panel A of Table 3. As can 
be seen, after eliminating the GCW cases reported in 2004, results for rival firms are not 
as strong as the main ones. In fact, the only negative CAR with a slight statistical 
significance (p=0,09116) can be noticed in the 5 days window around the event date (-5; 
5). Therefore, there is some evidence that the year with highest concentration of GCW 
has an inportant influence in the main results. 
 
Table 3. Panel A. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – 
excluding GCW cases in 2004. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 75 0,001061 0,68285 0,45333 
(-1; 0) 75 -0,002179 0,94 0,42667 
(-1; 1) 75 -0,004776 0,85414 0,4 
(2; 6) 75 -0,00236 0,17586 0,45333 
(-5; 5) 75 -0,012986 0,09116 0,4 
(-6; 6) 75 -0,006076 0,209 0,46667 
(-10; 10) 75 -0,008721 0,1985 0,38667 
 
Panel B of table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for rival firms of 
GCW cases excluding those operating in the two industries with more occurrences. In 
this case, the results are in line with the ones reported for the full sample analysis. As 
can be seen, there are no significant abnormal returns for the (-6, -2), (-1, 0), and (-1, 1) 
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windows. However, there is some evidence of significant negative abnormal reaction in 
the (2, 6) period and significant negative abnormal reaction at a 5% level for the larger 
periods surrounding the GCW event date. This significant abnormal reaction is around -
1,5% for the (-5, 5), (-6, 6) and (-10, 10) windows. Therefore, these results suggest that 
the competitive intra-industry effect documented in the main analysis is not dependent 
on industry concentration.  
 
Table 3. Panel B. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – 
excluding GCW cases of firms operating in the ”Pharmaceutical Preparations” (SIC 
code 2834) and ”Services-Computer programming, data processing, etc.” (SIC code 
7370). 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 81 -0,003044 0,33031 0,40741 
(-1; 0) 81 -0,003562 0,60523 0,46914 
(-1; 1) 81 -0,005939 0,5717 0,4321 
(2; 6) 81 -0,004843 0,05782 0,38272 
(-5; 5) 81 -0,018553 0,01262 0,33333 
(-6; 6) 81 -0,013827 0,03213 0,39506 
(-10; 10) 81 -0,015244 0,04279 0,33333 
 
As the activity of a specific firm is always influenced by external environmental 
factors, the next robustness test investigates if the competitive intra-industry effect 
observed previously depends on external factors related to industry or is related to 
firm’s internal factors. These tests also imply the creation of two sub-samples. First 
sample consists of rival firms for all the consecutive GCW cases during a one-week 
period of time of the firms belonging to the same 4-digit SIC code industry. The second 
sample, on the other hand, integrates all rival firms for the first GCW cases of a 
calendar year of the firms belonging to any 4-digit SIC code industry in the main 
sample. 
According to the data in Panel C of Table 3, the abnormal daily returns of the 
GCW firms in the same 4-digit SIC code industry are non-significant for most of the 
windows analysed. However, the abnormal return computed for the (-6, 6) window is 
slightly significant at a 10% level. These results suggest that the competitive effect is 
not driven by firms associated to multiple GCW events.  
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Table 3. Panel C. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – 
Multiple-firm GCW events. Abnormal performance of industries experiencing 
consecutive disclosures of qualified audit reports by firms in the same 4-digit SIC code 
industry within a one-week period. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 73 -0,004259 0,34721 0,41096 
(-1; 0) 73 -0,00413 0,50665 0,43836 
(-1; 1) 73 -0,006162 0,58234 0,42466 
(2; 6) 73 -0,001692 0,24054 0,41096 
(-6; 6) 73 -0,012113 0,0868 0,41096 
 Panel D presents the CARs of rival firms for the first GCW events of the year 
within different intervals of time. As can be seen, the results are stronger than the ones 
presented in table C for multiple-firm GCW events. For instance, one week before the 
event (-6; -2), there is a significant negative anticipation of -2,2% (p=0,009). In 
contrast, in the one week following the event date (2, 6), there is no abnormal reaction 
to the publication of a GCW. More important, although the non-significant result for the 
(-1, 1) period, there is a significant abnormal reaction in the (-6, 6) period surrounding 
the event date of -4,8%. Altogether, these results indicate that the competitive effect is 
stronger for the first GCW case within each industry and this effect is stronger in the 
days immediately before the GCW announcement.  
 
Table 3. Panel D. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – 
robustness tests. First GCW case per calendar year and industry. Only the first GCW 
event per calendar year and 4-digit SIC code industry is kept in the sample. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 11 -0,021912 0,00953 0,18182 
(-1; 0) 11 0,01555 0,03808 0,72727 
(-1; 1) 11 0,001127 0,8647 0,36364 
(2; 6) 11 -0,027565 0,14872 0,27273 
(-6; 6) 11 -0,04835 0,01814 0,27273 
 
  The last robustness test analyzes the abnormal performance of certain 4-digit 
SIC code industries from the main sample. This test aims at analysing which industries 
are more associated to the competitive effect since the specific characteristics of each 
industry may explain their propensity to this phenomenon. To perform this test, 
abnormal returns of rival firms are now computed by industry for those that are 
associated to a minumum of 5 GCW events. 
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Panel E of Table 3 presents the results for this robustness test and identifies five 
industries associated to a minimum of 5 GCW cases: ”Pharmaceutical Preparations” 
(SIC code 2834), ”Biological Products, except Diagnostic Substances” (SIC code 2836), 
”Radiotelephone Communications” (SIC code 4812),”Computer Programming, Data 
Processing, and other Computer Related Services” (SIC code 7370) and ”Prepackaged 
Software” (SIC code 7372).  
 
Table 3. Panel E. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals –Industry 
specific market reaction. Abnormal performance for each 4-digit SIC code industry 
from the sample. 
SIC Code  Period N Rivals CAR P-value 
% 
Positive 
2834 (-6; -2) 8 55,375 -0,01597 0,41823 0,375 
2836 (-6; -2) 6 55,3333 -0,01073 0,21576 0,16667 
4812 (-6; -2) 5 12,6 0,02898 0,30541 0,8 
7370 (-6; -2) 6 50,6667 0,0136 0,69865 0,66667 
7372 (-6; -2) 9 79,8889 0,00446 0,90836 0,55556 
2834 (-1; 0) 8 55,375 0,01721 0,24353 0,5 
2836 (-1; 0) 6 55,3333 0,0006 0,74558 0,66667 
4812 (-1; 0) 5 12,6 0,00522 0,5781 0,6 
7370 (-1; 0) 6 50,6667 -0,0011 0,72581 0,33333 
7372 (-1; 0) 9 79,8889 0,0029 0,83932 0,55556 
2834 (-1; 1) 8 55,375 0,01023 0,56583 0,375 
2836 (-1; 1) 6 55,3333 0,00742 0,34218 0,66667 
4812 (-1; 1) 5 12,6 -0,00714 0,62117 0,6 
7370 (-1; 1) 6 50,6667 -0,00672 0,95736 0,33333 
7372 (-1; 1) 9 79,8889 -0,00128 0,4903 0,33333 
2834 (2; 6) 8 55,375 0,0215 0,46721 0,625 
2836 (2; 6) 6 55,3333 -0,00929 0,25428 0,33333 
4812 (2; 6) 5 12,6 0,00447 0,50725 0,4 
7370 (2; 6) 6 50,6667 -0,03201 0,12688 0,33333 
7372 (2; 6) 9 79,8889 -0,01961 0,09324 0,22222 
2834 (-6; 6) 8 55,375 0,01576 0,70808 0,5 
2836 (-6; 6) 6 55,3333 -0,01261 0,07798 0,16667 
4812 (-6; 6) 5 12,6 0,02631 0,33499 0,8 
7370 (-6; 6) 6 50,6667 -0,02514 0,39132 0,5 
7372 (-6; 6) 9 79,8889 -0,01642 0,24018 0,33333 
2834 (-10; 10) 8 55,375 0,01218 0,93959 0,5 
2836 (-10; 10) 6 55,3333 -0,01691 0 0 
4812 (-10; 10) 5 12,6 0,03921 0,4628 0,6 
7370 (-10; 10) 6 50,6667 -0,04698 0,29416 0,16667 
7372 (-10; 10) 9 79,8889 -0,02359 0,2559 0,33333 
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Taking into consideration the limited number of observations, the results are not 
significant. In fact, almost all the CARs are statistically non-significant, except the 
1,96% decrease one week following the GCW announcement ((2; 6), p=0,09324) in the 
”Prepackaged Software” industry (SIC code 7372) and the 1,26% decrease in the one-
week window around the event date (-6; 6) in the ”Biological Products, except 
Diagnostic Substances” industry (SIC code 2836) with p=0,07798. Therefore, these 
results do not allow a robust conclusion due to the limited number of cases in each 
industry. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 This master thesis examines whether the disclosure of a going concern 
withdrawal impacts on the rival firms of the announcing firm. The analysis was 
performed over 95 firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ for which auditors 
withdrawn a going-concern audit report between 1995 and 2008 and 2.673 rival firms. 
The good news associated to this disclosure revealed to have a significant negative 
impact on the rival firms operating in the same industry to the announcement firm. This 
significant negative impact on rival firms suggests that GCW audit reports generate a 
competitive intra-industry effect. 
 
This master thesis confirms previous studies’ results showing that the GCW does 
not impact in the market value of the announcing firms in the days surrounding the 
event date. More interestingly, this study provides the first approach in the impact of 
such news in the rivals of the announcing firms. In particular, results show significant 
negative abnormal returns of approximately -1,5% for the (-5, 5), (-6, 6) and (-10, 10) 
windows surrounding the GCW announcement. In addition, there is some evidence that 
this competitive effect is due to investors’ reaction immediately after the announcement 
day and not by an anticipation of the information. The robustness tests indicate that the 
competitive effect is likely to be influenced by the first GCW cases per industry and is 
not driven by the most representative industries in the GCW sample.  
 
Taken together, the results of this thesis suggest that the GCW announcement 
brings important information to the market value of firms operating in the same industry 
with the announcement firms. This competitive intra-industry effect may be used in the 
decision making process of investors when taking investment decisions. 
 
 These results must be read with caution as the number of GCW firms is 
somehow limited. This limitation conditioned the robustness tests as the constitution of 
sub-samples reduced even more the number of cases under scrutiny. As such, as 
suggestion for further work, one can update the sample with more recent GCW cases 
allowing a larger sample and increase the power of the statistic tests. Another oportunity 
is to perform a multivariate analysis allowing a better understanting of the cause-effect 
relation in this domain. 
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ATTACHMENTS 
 
Table 1. General statistics 
 
This table summarizes statistics associated to the GCW firms and their industry 
rivals. GCW firms are non-utility, non-financial U.S. firms trading on the NYSE, 
NASDAQ or AMEX that receive a clean audit report in the subsequent year to their 
first-time going concern audit report between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2008. Industry 
rivals are publicly traded firms with the same 4-digit SIC code as the GCW firm, and 
data available on both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  
All accounting data is collected from the 10-K report one year before the GCW 
publication date. 
 
Panel A: GCW firms 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Low. Quart. Median Upp. Quart. 
Size  129,4 178,1 22,9 69,5 156 
Revenue 185,8 849,10 6,9 18,8 63,5 
CF 
Operations 
0,27 71,03 -10,3 -3,8 0,27 
ROA -44,10% 55,30% -63,10% -26,10% -5,80% 
Z-Score 0,38 9,01 -4,51 -2,31 3,49 
Big 4  61,10% - - - - 
 
Panel B: Industry rivals 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Low. Quart. Median Upp. Quart. 
Size  6066,4 31501 68,67 236,3 886,8 
Revenue 1382,5 6.256,00 12,47 49,2 261 
CF 
Operations 
238,6 1338 -12,37 -1,2 21,1 
ROA -24,67% 133,70% -34,70% -8,66% 6,34% 
Z-Score -2,94 30,6 -7,41 -5,35 -2,54 
Big 4  89,60% - - - - 
 
Where: 
Size represents the equity market capitalization in US Dollars in Millions ($m), 
measured at the release date of the GCW audit report.  
Revenue represents total revenues in $m.  
ROA represents the return on assets, computed as the ratio of EBIT to total assets.  
CF Operations represents the cash-flow from operations in $m.  
Z-score represents a composite measure of financial distress computes as in Zmijewski 
(1984).  
Big 4 is a dummy that assumes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm or 
one of its predecessors and zero otherwise.  
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Table 2. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for GCW firms their industry 
rivals 
 
This table displays the short-term cumulative abnormal daily stock returns 
associated with the disclosure of GCW report for both the announcing firms and their 
industry rivals. GCW firms are non-utility, non-financial U.S. firms trading on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX that receive a a clean audit report in the subsequent year to 
their first-time going concern audit report between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2008. Industry 
rivals are publicly traded firms with the same 4-digit SIC code as the GCW firm, and 
data available on both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the market model residual in percent. 
The abnormal performance for industry rivals is the equally weighted average return of 
the 95 value-weighted rival portfolios.  
 
Panel A: GCW firms 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 95 -0,011275 0,868 40% 
(-1; 0) 95 -0,018687 0,167 38% 
(-1; 1) 95 -0,015492 0,608 44% 
(2; 6) 95 0,005712 0,550 44% 
(-6; 6) 95 -0,021056 0,970 45% 
(-10; 10) 95 -0,058882 0,168 36% 
 
Panel B: Industry rivals 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 95 -0,003082 0,272 42% 
(-1; 0) 95 -0,001658 0,918 46% 
(-1; 1) 95 -0,004627 0,703 42% 
(2; 6) 95 -0,00434 0,074 40% 
(-5; 5) 95 -0,015638 0,025 36% 
(-6; 6) 95 -0,012049 0,037 41% 
(-10; 10) 95 -0,014938 0,031 34% 
 
Where: 
Period is shown in trading days considering trading-day zero as the GCW event-date.  
N is the number of cases that were used in obtaining the cumulative abnormal returns.  
CAR is the mean cumulative abnormal return.  
P-value is the significance level of the results, it is a number between 0 and 1. If p-
value (≤ 0.05), it indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, p-value (> 0.05) 
indicates weak evidence against the null hypothesis and a p-value close to the cutoff 
(0.05) is considered to be marginal (could go either way). 
% Positive is the percentage of positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
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Table 3. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – robustness 
tests 
 
This table presents the short-term cumulative abnormal daily stock returns 
associated with the disclosure of GCW report for industry rivals. GCW firms are non-
utility, non-financial U.S. firms trading on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX that receive 
a a clean audit report in the subsequent year to their first-time going concern audit 
report between 01/01/1995 and 31/12/2008. Industry rivals are publicly traded firms 
with the same 4-digit SIC code as the GCW firm, and data available on both CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) represents the market model 
residual in percent. The abnormal performance for industry rivals represents the equally 
weighted average return of the 95 value-weighted rival portfolios.  
Where: 
Period is shown in trading days considering trading-day zero as the GCW event-date.  
N is the number of cases that were used in obtaining the cumulative abnormal returns.  
CAR is the mean cumulative abnormal return.  
P-value is the significance level of the results, it is a number between 0 and 1. If p-
value (≤ 0.05), it indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, p-value (> 0.05) 
indicates weak evidence against the null hypothesis and a p-value close to the cutoff 
(0.05) is considered to be marginal (could go either way). 
% Positive is the percentage of positive cumulative abnormal returns.  
  
Panel A: Year of concentration. The GCWs from 2004 are eliminated from the sample. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 75 0,001061 0,68285 0,45333 
(-1; 0) 75 -0,002179 0,94 0,42667 
(-1; 1) 75 -0,004776 0,85414 0,4 
(2; 6) 75 -0,00236 0,17586 0,45333 
(-5; 5) 75 -0,012986 0,09116 0,4 
(-6; 6) 75 -0,006076 0,209 0,46667 
(-10; 10) 75 -0,008721 0,1985 0,38667 
 
Panel B: Industry of concentration. GCWs disclosed by firms competing in the 
”Pharmaceutical Preparations” (SIC code 2834) and ”Services-Computer programming, 
data processing, etc.” (SIC code 7370) industries are eliminated from the sample. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 81 -0,003044 0,33031 0,40741 
(-1; 0) 81 -0,003562 0,60523 0,46914 
(-1; 1) 81 -0,005939 0,5717 0,4321 
(2; 6) 81 -0,004843 0,05782 0,38272 
(-5; 5) 81 -0,018553 0,01262 0,33333 
(-6; 6) 81 -0,013827 0,03213 0,39506 
(-10; 10) 81 -0,015244 0,04279 0,33333 
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Table 3. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – robustness 
tests (continuation) 
 
Panel C: Multiple-firm GCW events. Abnormal performance of industries experiencing 
consecutive disclosures of qualified audit reports by firms in the same 4-digit SIC code 
industry within a one-week period. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 73 -0,004259 0,34721 0,41096 
(-1; 0) 73 -0,00413 0,50665 0,43836 
(-1; 1) 73 -0,006162 0,58234 0,42466 
(2; 6) 73 -0,001692 0,24054 0,41096 
(-6; 6) 73 -0,012113 0,0868 0,41096 
 
Panel D: First GCW case per calendar year and industry. Only the first GCW event per 
calendar year and 4-digit SIC code industry is kept in the sample. 
Period N CAR P-value % Positive 
(-6; -2) 11 -0,021912 0,00953 0,18182 
(-1; 0) 11 0,01555 0,03808 0,72727 
(-1; 1) 11 0,001127 0,8647 0,36364 
(2; 6) 11 -0,027565 0,14872 0,27273 
(-6; 6) 11 -0,04835 0,01814 0,27273 
 
Additionally, in Panel E: 
Sic Code represents the 4-digit SIC code of each individual industry. 
Events represents the number of GCW events within each individual industry. 
Rivals represents the average number of rivals per GCW event. 
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Table 3. Cumulative abnormal daily stock returns for industry rivals – robustness 
tests (continuation) 
 
Panel E: Industry specific market reaction. Abnormal performance for each 4-digit SIC 
code industry from the sample. 
SIC Code  Period N Rivals CAR P-value 
% 
Positive 
2834 (-6; -2) 8 55,375 -0,01597 0,41823 0,375 
2836 (-6; -2) 6 55,3333 -0,01073 0,21576 0,16667 
4812 (-6; -2) 5 12,6 0,02898 0,30541 0,8 
7370 (-6; -2) 6 50,6667 0,0136 0,69865 0,66667 
7372 (-6; -2) 9 79,8889 0,00446 0,90836 0,55556 
2834 (-1; 0) 8 55,375 0,01721 0,24353 0,5 
2836 (-1; 0) 6 55,3333 0,0006 0,74558 0,66667 
4812 (-1; 0) 5 12,6 0,00522 0,5781 0,6 
7370 (-1; 0) 6 50,6667 -0,0011 0,72581 0,33333 
7372 (-1; 0) 9 79,8889 0,0029 0,83932 0,55556 
2834 (-1; 1) 8 55,375 0,01023 0,56583 0,375 
2836 (-1; 1) 6 55,3333 0,00742 0,34218 0,66667 
4812 (-1; 1) 5 12,6 -0,00714 0,62117 0,6 
7370 (-1; 1) 6 50,6667 -0,00672 0,95736 0,33333 
7372 (-1; 1) 9 79,8889 -0,00128 0,4903 0,33333 
2834 (2; 6) 8 55,375 0,0215 0,46721 0,625 
2836 (2; 6) 6 55,3333 -0,00929 0,25428 0,33333 
4812 (2; 6) 5 12,6 0,00447 0,50725 0,4 
7370 (2; 6) 6 50,6667 -0,03201 0,12688 0,33333 
7372 (2; 6) 9 79,8889 -0,01961 0,09324 0,22222 
2834 (-6; 6) 8 55,375 0,01576 0,70808 0,5 
2836 (-6; 6) 6 55,3333 -0,01261 0,07798 0,16667 
4812 (-6; 6) 5 12,6 0,02631 0,33499 0,8 
7370 (-6; 6) 6 50,6667 -0,02514 0,39132 0,5 
7372 (-6; 6) 9 79,8889 -0,01642 0,24018 0,33333 
2834 (-10; 10) 8 55,375 0,01218 0,93959 0,5 
2836 (-10; 10) 6 55,3333 -0,01691 0 0 
4812 (-10; 10) 5 12,6 0,03921 0,4628 0,6 
7370 (-10; 10) 6 50,6667 -0,04698 0,29416 0,16667 
7372 (-10; 10) 9 79,8889 -0,02359 0,2559 0,33333 
 
 
 
